Humans are all too familiar with metacognitive experiences.
We all have experienced situations in which even though we cannot recall someone's name, we feel very confident that we will do so at a later time even without any external help. Many of us check that we have our passports and plane tickets before we leave the house for an overseas trip even though we remember fully well where we placed them the day before.
Even the act of tying a string around one's finger is an act grounded in metacognition-anticipating the possibility that we may forget to do something we place an unusual mark on our bodies as a reminder.
These are just three examples of human metacognition but we could easily conjure many more examples that would attest to the central role that metacognition, defined as knowing about our own psychological states, plays in our everyday experiences. Indeed, metacognition plays such a central role that it is hard to disentangle it from other psychological processes, and it is tantalizing to think that metacognition may be the cognitive ability that separates humans from animals.
My goal in this chapter is not to focus on human metacognition. Instead, my goal will be to investigate the question of whether non-human animals (henceforth animals) Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web possess metacognition. To do so, I will trace the emergence, development, and current state of one of the paradigms that has been used to investigate metacognition from a comparative perspective: the information-seeking paradigm.
Once that is done, I will establish links between this paradigm and other paradigms that have been used to investigate metacognition in animals. Some of them have a relatively long history while others are incipient attempts to develop alternative approaches to this fascinating question. Note that the adjective 'alternative' is not meant to indicate 'replacement', but 'complement'. In this section, it will become apparent, much to my surprise I have to admit, that the various approaches are currently producing a quite coherent picture that I will try to capture in the next section. In the final section, I will propose two main research lines that may foster growth in this field.
Metacognitive origins
Over the last two decades, questions about the knowledge that non-human animals possess about their physical and social worlds has gained increasing research attention. Social knowledge, in particular, has received considerable attention.
Researchers have assessed what non-human animals know about their social worlds both in terms of the social relations among their group members and the psychological states that they may infer to others. With regard to the latter, Premack and Woodruff's (1978) seminal paper on the attribution of intentions opened the way to questions of whether animals, most notably the great apes, attribute mental states to others. Although Premack and Woodruff (1978) contemplated attribution of mental states both to the self and others, most of the work on mental state attribution both in developmental and (p.63) comparative psychology has been devoted to investigate the mental states of others (see Call and Tomasello (2008) for a review). Only relatively recently, researchers have focused their attention on perhaps the more basic problem of what access individuals have about their own mental states.
Interestingly, the comparative study of the individual's own mental states, unlike the work aimed at investigating others' mental states, did not originally emerge from the mindreading Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web tradition pioneered by Premack and Woodruff (1978) or the precursors that one can find in developmental psychology (e.g. Flavell 1978) . Instead it emerged from cognitive psychology in the context of psychophysical research. Smith et al. (1995 Smith et al. ( , 1997 ) pioneered a method to investigate whether subjects were able to make metacognitive judgements when presented with uncertain situations. In their original escape response paradigm, subjects were presented with a discrimination task in which the stimuli varied in difficulty. Like many discrimination tasks, subjects were presented a stimulus and offered a choice of two options (one correct and the other incorrect) but additionally, they were offered the possibility to decline trials. That is, by pressing a third option, subjects could skip the current trial and move to the next one. The analysis of these so-called escape responses showed that subjects preferentially declined trials presenting difficult discriminations. In other words, as uncertainty regarding the likelihood of success increased so did the frequency of declined trials. Such results were obtained in various species including rhesus macaques, humans, and dolphins and using a variety of discrimination tasks. Smith and colleagues concluded that subjects were capable of monitoring their uncertainty states.
One criticism that those initial studies received was that subjects associated the escape response with reinforcement, or put differently, that certain stimuli configurations acted as discriminative stimuli for selecting the escape response due to its reinforcing qualities relative to the penalties associated with those particular stimuli (see Smith et al. 2003) . Note that these studies required extensive training for animals to learn to use the escape response properly. Consequently, subjects may not have been responding to their internal state of uncertainty but to the stimuli that they perceived. Additional studies, however, showed that the escape response was not simply tied to particular configurations because subjects were able to generalize the use of the escape response to novel discriminations that had not been associated with the escape response (e.g. Washburn et al. 2006) . Moreover, the presentation of massed trials and delayed reinforcement considerably weakens this criticism, thus suggesting that Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web (Couchman et al. 2010 ). This debate, however, is far from settled and advocates of the non-metacognitive account have proposed increasingly elaborate explanations to account for the continuous stream of studies reporting new findings based on new procedures (e.g. Crystal and Foote 2009) . I think that it is perhaps fair to say that the field has entered a sort of arms race in which increasingly elaborated non-metacognitive explanations are met with ever more sophisticated empirical evidence which in turn generate increasingly more complex non-metacognitive explanations.
Another approach to comparative metacognition Call and Carpenter (2001) took a different approach to the question of comparative metacognition. Unlike the approach of Smith and colleagues, Call and Carpenter's approach was grounded in the mindreading/developmental tradition. More specifically, the procedure that they devised relied heavily on the question of visual perspective taking and access to perceptual mental states. Instead of presenting individuals with ambiguous stimuli and training them to use an escape response, they presented subjects with incomplete information about the location of a reward in a foraging task and measured whether they sought additional information before they produced (p.64) a response. The main idea was whether subjects would be sensitive to their lack of information and remedy this situation before making a choice.
The original set-up of the information-seeking task was quite simple. Subjects faced two parallel tubes placed on a low lying platform with their openings oriented towards them. The experimenter placed a piece of food inside one of the tubes on the far side from where the subject was located. In order to obtain the food, all that the subject had to do was to touch the baited tube on their first attempt. No second choices were allowed. There were two conditions. In the visible condition, subjects witnessed the experimenter placing the food inside the tube whereas in the hidden condition the baiting took place behind an opaque occluder that blocked the subject's visual access. After the baiting was completed, the platform was pushed forward and the subject was allowed to select one Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web of the tubes by touching it. Whether subjects looked inside the tubes before choosing was the main dependent measure and was never trained prior to the test.
Chimpanzees, orangutans, and 2½-year-old children looked inside the tubes before choosing more often in the hidden than the visible condition (Call and Carpenter 2001) . Later studies using this same paradigm confirmed these results in other chimpanzees and orangutans and extended them to other species including gorillas, bonobos, and rhesus macaques (Hampton et al. 2004; Call 2005 Call , 2010 Basile et al. 2009 ). In contrast, capuchin monkeys and dogs produced mixed results (Bräuer et al. 2004; Paukner et al. 2006 ). Call and Carpenter (2001) interpreted their initial result as an indication that subjects had access to their own mental states; in this case, subjects knew that they had seen or not seen the reward. Three features of this task deserve special mention. First, from a practical point of view the implementation of this task is extremely simple. The apparatus is easy (and inexpensive) to build and the subjects require no special training since they only need to indicate their choices by touching one of the tubes-something that apes did quite spontaneously. The dependent measure of looking inside the tube, unlike the escape response, appeared spontaneously and it was not trained in any way. Second, and related to the previous point, the looking response is richer (and more open-ended) than the escape response since the former allows the experimenter to measure not only whether subjects produce the response, but also how they produce it. For instance, imagine that individuals A and B both look inside the tubes during a hidden trial but whereas individual A looks inside every tube possible (i.e. exhaustive search), individual B only looks inside the minimum number of tubes required to locate the reward (i.e. efficient search). Although both subjects produced the appropriate response, their different allocation of looks provides very useful information about the information controlling their search. Moreover, as we will see in the following sections, varying the features of the food hiding containers as well as the cost associated with looking (or not looking) can also reveal useful information that can play a Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web Flavell (1978 Flavell ( , 1993 established a connection between visual perspective-taking and metacognition research in children (see also Flavell et al. 1983) . Such a connection did not exist in the comparative literature because researchers solely investigated whether chimpanzees and other animals knew what others could or could not see from different locations (see Call and Tomasello (2008) for a review).
Recently, however, have shown that chimpanzees also know where they have to position themselves to see a particular object. Thus, chimpanzees (and perhaps other animals as well) know both whether someone can see object A from their current location and they also know where they have to position themselves to see object A.
(p.65) Alternative explanations Although Call and Carpenter (2001) tentatively interpreted their initial data as being consistent with a metacognitive account, other interpretations are indeed possible, as these authors themselves acknowledged. Thus, the initial findings are also consistent with several non-metacognitive explanations. In general, there have been two sorts of alternative explanations that differed in the broadness of their explanatory scope. The first sort of alternative is composed of 'narrow-beam' explanations, typically aimed at accounting for one particular finding, but making no specific predictions about future findings. The second alternative is a 'broad-beam' explanation based on identifying a non-metacognitive construct that can potentially account for the observed results without recourse to the monitoring of knowledge states. Unlike the narrow-beam explanations, this other approach has the very desirable feature of having the potential to explain multiple findings and, more importantly, it can generate testable hypotheses that can guide future research. New data, however, have also challenged each of these two families of explanations. Next, we present the various alternatives that Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web According to this hypothesis, subjects that lack information about the location of the food engage in search behaviour until they locate the reward. Two features of this search are important. First, it is automatically triggered upon detecting an information deficiency and second, the search is unguided (i.e. random). In fact, the search behaviours of this sort would be used both to disambiguate information (e.g. a cat moving its head sideways to determine whether that thing is a mouse; Carruthers 2008) or simply when an individual lacks information as in the case of the hidden condition of the seeking information task (Perner Chapter 6, this volume). Once the reward is viewed (or the information is disambiguated), the search ceases and subjects attempt to retrieve it. This 'search, locate, and retrieve' routine is presumably something that many animals are equipped with and will commonly use when foraging for hidden items.
At face value, this hypothesis can explain the difference between visible and hidden trials in the original study. Additionally, this hypothesis can explain why subjects search more often with increasing delays after they have seen the location of the reward (Call 2010) . Here, a delay between encoding the food location and food acquisition may have prevented subjects from retrieving that information, thus transforming an originally visible condition into a hidden condition in which subjects no longer can access their knowledge about the location of the food. However, there are three aspects to the observed data that do not fit with this explanation.
First, on a sizable percentage of trials which vary between 16% and 30% depending on the studies and the species, subjects selected the correct alternative after having inspected the tube that was empty (Call and Carpenter 2001;  Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web Call 2005). That is, subjects stopped searching before they actually viewed the reward, which does not fit with the searching until locating the food before choosing strategy. At the very least, this result indicates that subjects were able to disambiguate the situation without seeing the reward by using inference by exclusion (Premack and Premack 1994; Call 2004 Call , 2006 ). This represents a more complex routine than the original search until locating the reward routine (see also Perner Chapter 6, this volume).
Second, contrary to what this hypothesis postulates, subjects' search is not random but guided. presented chimpanzees with three types of containers: cylinders, triangles, (p.66) and trapezoids. Prior to the test, they allowed the subjects to explore those objects. Two of the objects were completely new and had never been associated with food. After the exploration was over, placed a set of three identical containers on a platform forming a straight line. In different trials subjects faced either three cylinders placed on the platform in an upright position, three triangles, or three trapezoids and the experimenter baited one of the containers. The crucial aspect of this study was that owing to the containers' diverse geometry and their position on the platform, subjects had to position themselves in different locations depending on the container to spy the food. In particular, subjects had to climb and look from above to see the food inside the upright cylinders, they had to move to the side of the platform to see the triangle openings, and they had to move behind the trapezoids, thus changing their position 180 degrees with respect to their original location, to see the food inside them. Just like in previous studies, subjects looked inside the containers more often when they had not witnessed the baiting compared to when they had seen it. More importantly, the search was non-random. In particular, chimpanzees looked from above, side, and behind for the cylinders, triangles, and trapezoids, respectively. They did so even if only their first look was considered. This result is completely inconsistent with random search and demonstrated that subjects knew exactly where they had to position themselves to see the food.
Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web Third, the generalized search hypothesis does not explain why subjects also look when they have witnessed the baiting. One could attribute those looks to the fact that they may have forgotten the location of the food, especially after longer delays. However, this does not explain why when they look, they do not look randomly but preferentially look inside the baited container, thus showing that they still remember the location of the food (Call 2010) . Moreover, looks also exist even after short delays when the memories have not degraded yet, and again those looks (unlike those in the hidden condition) are preferentially targeted to the baited rather than the unbaited container (Call and Carpenter 2001) . Another explanation is therefore necessary.
A second hypothesis that has been proposed to explain why subjects look inside tubes is because they may like the sight of the food (Perner pers. comm.). Here subjects would not be attempting to remedy some informational shortcoming, but seeing the reward per se has some hedonic value. Although this could certainly explain why they look inside tubes, it does not explain why they look more often in hidden than visible trials, why looking increases as a function of delay, why they select on about 25% of the trials after having not seen the reward or why once they have located the reward, they do not look again but choose. Moreover, if the tubes are shaken with the consequence that the baited tube produces a rattling sound, looking inside the tubes is reduced (Call 2010) .
Interestingly, the reduction is only observed in those subjects who had been able to use the noise made by the reward to infer its location in a previous study (Call 2004) . Unless one postulates that hearing the reward also possesses hedonic value that replaces seeing the food, but this only occurs for those individuals capable of establishing a causal relation between the presence of the food and the production of noise, this result is hard to explain. Nevertheless, this hypothesis awaits empirical scrutiny.
Finally, the response competition hypothesis postulates that selecting one alternative will take precedence over looking unless the lack of information decreases the strength of the selection response (Hampton et al. 2004) . One recent result, however, is completely inconsistent with this hypothesis.
Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web When subjects are presented with high-quality versus lowquality food, they look more often before choosing when the high-quality rather than the low-quality food is at stake (Call 2010) . And they do so even if the baiting is conducted in full view of the subject. This is precisely the opposite result predicted by the response competition hypothesis since higher-quality food should reduce looking by increasing the strength of the reaching response. Interestingly, control tests showed that subjects remembered equally well the location of (p.67) high-and low-quality food. Call (2010) interpreted this result as an indication that subjects may entertain the possibility of being wrong in their choices and that is why they check more often when high-quality food is at stake even though their memories are equally good for both types of food.
Other studies have shown that individuals take cost into account when deciding whether they visually inspect inside the tubes before choosing. Hampton et al. (2004) found that increasing or decreasing the cost of looking into the tubes by placing the tubes lower or higher from the face of rhesus macaques affected the likelihood that they would look inside them. Call (2010) also investigated whether increasing the cost for looking affected the subjects' responses in gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos. However, instead of raising or lowering the tubes, he placed them on a fixed platform either in an oblique or a straight orientation with respect to the subject. This meant that looking inside oblique-oriented tubes was harder than looking inside straight-oriented tubes. Results confirmed those of Hampton showing that looking responses decreased as cost of looking increased. Interestingly, the reduction of looking was more pronounced when subjects had seen the baiting (42%) than when they had not witnessed it (13%). This suggests that subjects were more likely to forgo looking when they had already seen the reward.
Broad-beam explanations Carruthers (2008) has taken a different approach in criticizing the studies on animal metacognition. Rather than postulating specific rules to explain specific results, as previous hypotheses had done, Carruthers (2008) postulating that animals, including humans, react to the level of anxiety that they perceive in certain situations. Thus, subjects are not reacting to their knowledge states but to the anxiety produced by those knowledge states. According to Carruthers (2008) an individual's knowledge states are opaque to the individual-something that also often applies to humans who may have the illusion that they know what they are reacting to when in reality they do not know.
One of the most appealing aspects of Carruthers' proposal is that an anxiety-mediated behaviour has a potential broad application. In fact, Carruthers (2008) used this model to strip metacognition out of the escape response and seeking information paradigms. Focusing on the seeking information paradigm, Carruthers' model can easily explain a variety of findings including the difference between visible and hidden conditions and the increase in looking as a function of delay since the baiting took place. It can even explain the so-called passport effect (Call and Carpenter 2001; Call 2010;  i.e. the likelihood of seeking information increases directly proportional to the cost of failing to locate the reward) since the anticipation of not receiving the high-quality food may generate more anxiety than not receiving the low-quality food.
However, there are some findings that this account cannot fully explain.
First and foremost, there is the search specificity. Recall that when subjects sought information, they engaged in targeted searches, they did not search randomly. The anxiety model, however, cannot explain this result because it postulates that the search for additional information is triggered automatically and gathered randomly. In this model, there is no room for directed searches because this would mean that subjects can distinguish between the information that they possess and the information that they are missing, and additionally, they would know how to remedy their informational shortcomings. Search specificity, however, can be explained by postulating that subjects must engage in some form of perspectival abilities about what they need to see to make the correct selection.
Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web Second, there is the question of the interchangeability of information. Recall that subjects who heard the rattling of the reward inside the tube, looked inside the tube less than when they were (p.68) not offered this auditory information. Under the anxiety-based model, it is unclear why hearing the reward would ameliorate the anxiety (thus reducing looking responses) produced by not having seen the reward-unless the subjects treat seeing and hearing the food as equivalent from a point of view of their choices. Moreover, note that not all subjects treated this additional auditory information in this way. Only those who were able to use auditory information to infer the food location were able to reduce their looking behaviour in the metacognitive task. Again, it seems that anxiety alone would not have predicted this outcome especially since this only applies to those individuals capable of making inferences.
Building bridges between paradigms
So far we have mostly concentrated on the results of the information-seeking paradigm. Next we turn our attention to other paradigms that have been used to investigate metacognition to find out whether both sets of results are consistent with each other at various levels of analysis.
Delay and accuracy Hampton (2001) observed that rhesus macaques increased their escape responses in a delayed matching to sample (DMTS) task as a function of the delay between the presentation of the sample and the alternatives-the longer the delay between the presentation of the sample and the selection of one of the alternatives, the more likely subjects were to select the escape option. This result is comparable to the data showing that subjects were more likely to seek information after longer delays (Call 2010) . Kornell et al.'s (2007) study on hint seeking in macaques is also consistent with the data from these other tasks. Kornell et al. (2007) trained monkeys to touch a series of stimuli in a certain order. Touching the stimuli set in the correct order produced a reward whereas touching them in the wrong order produced no reward and a timeout. Once subjects had learned this basic task, they learned that they could press another key to request Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web a hint about what was the next stimulus that needed to be touched to complete the correct sequence. Results showed that hint requests decreased as the monkeys' accuracy on the sequences increased. These data are complementary with the two previous studies that showed that escaping and information seeking also decreased with accuracy, which in turn decreased with time.
Risk and gambling
Suda-King (2008) pioneered a method that combines elements from both the escape response and the information-seeking paradigms. Suda-King (2008) investigated how orangutans responded to situations in which they had to choose between a 100% chance (P = 1.00) of getting a low-quality food or a variable probability (but always P 〈1.00) of getting a highquality food. The probability of getting the high-quality food was modified by varying the number of containers under which a single (high-quality) piece of food could be hidden. Just like in the information-seeking paradigm, Suda-King (2008) administered to subjects both visible and hidden trials. In visible trials subjects witnessed where the food was placed whereas in the hidden trials subjects were prevented from seeing the food's destination. Results showed that subjects were more likely to select the low-quality food in hidden trials. This is equivalent to selecting the escape response and netting the low-quality but certain reward in Hampton's (2001) study. Moreover, it shows that when facing incomplete information subjects not only seek additional information but also escape when they have no way to acquire information about the food location. smaller but safer option than chimpanzees and orangutans. These findings corroborated a previous study showing that bonobos were more risk averse than chimpanzees (Heilbronner et al. 2008) . Moreover, all species reduced their choice of the smaller but safer reward as the size of the risky option was increased or the probability of finding it was increased by reducing the number of cups under which the risky option could be found. In fact, the number of cups available and the size of the reward under the cups explained more than 70% of the observed variance in the subjects' choices. Crucially, we found no evidence that repeated trial presentations affected the subjects' choices. In other words, the response patterns did not change within a session or between sessions. Thus, apes' sensitivity to the number of cups available and the size of the risky reward in hidden trials suggests that they can estimate, at least implicitly, the likelihood that their choices will be successful and then choose optimally in many cases.
The two previous studies possess another desirable feature in terms of metacognition. They involve the assessment of risk.
Much work on human metacognition is based on asking subjects to make judgements about how certain they are about something or the likelihood that they will be able to recall some piece of information. Non-human animals cannot be directly interrogated in the same way as humans, but researchers have found ways to measure confidence in an indirect manner. This indirect method is based on the idea that subjects that are more confident about their responses may be more likely to take risks. One way to measure this is with the visible-hidden manipulation indicated previously, especially when it involves other factors such as the number of cups available where the high-quality food may be hidden. Recall that subjects are less willing to gamble when they have not seen the reward location in the risky choices. Son and Kornell (2005) assessed risk in a different way in rhesus macaques-a way that makes it more similar to the way people are asked to make certainty judgements. Macaques were required to judge the length of a stimulus presented on a computer screen and once they had made a choice they could decide how much food they wanted to gamble in that Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web particular trial before they were given feedback about their response. Son and Kornell (2005) observed that when facing an easy discrimination, monkeys gambled big (and won big) whereas when they faced a difficult discrimination they were more conservative and gambled smaller quantities. In a followup test, monkeys were able to transfer their 'gambling' skills previously associated with length discrimination to a task that involved assessing the pixel density of stimuli and another task that entailed recalling the picture of the object that they had been shown previously out of a collection of multiple objects. Apes, macaques, and capuchins The comparisons between species tested on different paradigms have also produced a rather coherent picture. Macaques have produced evidence consistent with metacognition both in the escape response paradigm (based both on discrimination and DMTS tests) and the informationseeking paradigm (e.g. Smith et al. 1997; Hampton 2001; Hampton et al. 2004) . Similarly, apes have produced positive results both in the information seeking and the risk-safe reward paradigms (Call and Carpenter 2001; Suda-King 2008; Haun et al. 2011 ). Although Haun et al. (2011) found differences between bonobos and the other great ape species in the risk-safe task, Heilbronner et al. (2008) also found those interspecific differences even though their study did not assess metacognition. Thus, those interspecific differences may be related to risk-proneness rather than metacognition. All other studies that have included multiple great ape species have (p.70) found no differences among them (e.g. Call and Carpenter 2001; Call 2005 Call , 2010 . In contrast to the studies on macaques and apes, studies on capuchin monkeys have produced inconsistent evidence for metacognition in this species. In fact, mixed results for capuchin monkeys have been found in almost every paradigm tested including the seeking information and the escape response paradigms based on DMTS and other discrimination tasks previously used with macaques (Paukner et al. 2006; Basile et al. 2009; Beran et al. 2009; Fujita 2009 ).
As Smith (2009) to non-metacognitive explanations that invoke psychological processes that are shared by many species. In particular, it is unclear how the reinforcement history and anxiety postulated to explain the positive results in metacognition experiments (e.g. Carruthers 2008; Crystal and Foote 2009) can also explain the negative results of some species. After all, those species that fail the metacognitive tests do possess those psychological processes. Indeed, some of those experiments show that capuchins, just like macaques, can learn the tasks' basic requisites, but unlike macaques they do not seem to respond in the same way when facing uncertain situations (Paukner et al. 2006; Basile et al. 2009; Beran et al. 2009; Fujita 2009 ).
Appearance and reality
Recently, another research avenue based on the appearancereality distinction has been assayed in non-human animals as a tool to investigate metacognition. Developmental psychologists have used this method extensively to investigate children's appreciation of their own and others' mental states.
According to Flavell et al. (1983) , recognizing and distinguishing appearance from reality is a commonplace experience for humans, one that is metacognitive in nature. Appearance-reality tasks typically involve presenting an object whose appearance leads children to judge its true nature incorrectly. For instance, children are presented with a sponge that looks like a rock and asked about it. When children judge it to be a rock, they are shown the true nature of the object. Researchers then ask children both about what the object looks like and what the object really is. Prior to 4 years of age, most children respond to both questions in the same way. In some cases, some children presented with an object behind a magnifying state that the object actually becomes smaller after the removal of a magnifying glass. In contrast, by the age of 4 these appearance reality errors have decreased dramatically.
Similar to the information-seeking and uncertainty-monitoring tasks, subjects in appearance reality tasks are confronted with ambiguous stimuli that create some perceptual/cognitive conflict that they need to resolve. This conflict, however, is not created by missing information or difficult discriminations but Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web by contradictory information. Consequently, solving the task does not entail escaping or seeking additional information but being able to ignore appearances and focus on reality. Appearance-reality tasks in children typically involve presenting subjects with an object whose appearance leads children to judge its true nature incorrectly, something that is commonly seen in children before their fourth birthdays. Flavell and colleagues (1983) have argued that the difficulty for dealing with perceptual appearances is related to a more general limitation about analyzing the origin and properties of their mental representations.
The eminently verbal nature of the task has prevented researchers from using the same task with non-verbal organisms. Therefore, used an indirect method to investigate how chimpanzees dealt with misleading appearances. In general, chimpanzees have a strong tendency to prefer larger over smaller grapes. However, when a smaller and a larger grape were placed behind a maximizing and a minimizing glass, respectively, thus reversing their virtual sizes, about 60% of the chimpanzees still selected the larger grape. They did this even when they were prevented from tracking the spatial position of the grape and they could only use the deceptive appearance of the grape to decide which one of the two grapes was larger. Moreover, two (p.71) control tests demonstrated that subjects did not solve this task by using a mechanism akin to that seen in reversed reward contingency tasks (i.e. pick the small grape to net the large one; Boysen and Berntson 1995) . Therefore, this study showed that some chimpanzees were quite capable of overcoming appearances, which suggests that they, just like 3-year-old children, may possess some appreciation of the origin of their own perceptions and how the interposition of certain objects (e.g. magnifying glass) between themselves and the food affects them. It is still an open question whether chimpanzees can also maintain an awareness of misleading information once they know the true nature of an object. Additional research is needed to answer this question and to extend these findings to other appearance-reality tasks as well as to other species.
Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web 
A synthetic view
It is certainly premature to attempt an integrated view of the field let alone trace the evolution of metacognition based on the available evidence. The data are too few both in terms of the species investigated and the number of paradigms that have been used in a relatively small number of individuals. So this will be by necessity an incomplete exercise but a necessary one as a way to assess where we stand and where we can go in the next few years. My main conclusion in this section is that the responses observed in metacognitive studies possess substantial cognitive flexibility. Both aspects are important. They are cognitive because not all available data can be reduced to anxiety monitoring, and they are flexible because individuals are capable of using information of various kinds, which in some cases includes making inferences, to produce efficient responses. In the next section, I will highlight two main research avenues through which the field may further develop.
How individuals respond to uncertainty has been the main question that research on metacognition in animals has investigated to date. Much less is known about other aspects of metacognition such as whether individuals are also capable of making confidence judgements in uncertain situations (but see Son and Kornell 2005) . I draw this distinction because it seems to me that making confidence judgements is a particularly refined indication of uncertainty monitoring since subjects in such tasks not only have to detect their uncertainty but they also have to evaluate its level. It is uncontroversial that animals facing either ambiguous stimuli, or stimuli that create an internal cognitive conflict, behave differently than those who are not facing a conflict. In particular, individuals experiencing a cognitive conflict change their response latency, waver between competing responses, and even opt for responding to several options simultaneously. Research on metacognition has also documented that, when faced with uncertainty, individuals may escape the situation or seek additional information to resolve the uncertainty. Such responses may also be accompanied by changes in the individual's anxiety levels as indicated by several physiological Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web First, when individuals are missing the information needed to choose correctly, they know where to look for it, and they engage in targeted searches. I will not elaborate further on this point (p.72) because it has been treated in the previous section. But briefly stated, detecting anxiety cannot predict where they will look because to do that, one has to know what one is looking for and what precisely needs to be done to find it. Second, individuals show a remarkable ability to integrate information from other modalities and thus replace the missing information appropriately. This is evidenced by the ability to replace missing visual information about the location of the food for the sound that the food makes when the baited tube is shaken. Note that only those individuals who can infer that the food is the cause of the auditory cue respond appropriately, which shows that the individual has to interpret the information in a causal manner. Even in cases in which the search produces no new information such as an auditory cue but just an empty tube, individuals can use this information to make an inference by exclusion and stop searching. Note that in both cases, spatiotemporal or cause-effect parameters play a crucial role in helping the individual infer the location of the food. Needless to say, in both cases once the sight of the food Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web has been replaced by either a rattling sound or the sight of an empty tube, individuals correctly choose the baited tube.
Finally, when the search cost for the food is increased, there is some evidence indicating that animals can skip that search but mostly when they have seen the baiting, not when they did not witness it. If anxiety is regulating their looks, the decrease should occur in both conditions equally, but it does not. This result is reminiscent of animals' search strategies with lowand high-quality food. Even though they look more when highquality food is at stake, they remember both types of food equally well. In other words, in visible trials both increasing the cost of searching and decreasing the cost of choosing incorrectly (by using a low-quality reward) produce the same effect: reduced looks. In such cases, searches become optional and individuals know it.
In summary, the great apes can resolve uncertainty by seeking information in a targeted manner, by replacing the missing information appropriately with equivalent information via inferential processes or forgoing the need to search for additional information when they have seen the food location and they still remember it. Taken together, these findings suggest that at least the great apes have some access to the causes of their uncertainty and they can deploy flexible means to remedy this situation. Given the data available on macaques in other metacognitive paradigms, it is likely that future studies will reveal that macaques' information seeking, just like that of the great apes, is targeted, integrated, and facultative.
Future directions
In the course of the last decade comparative metacognition has established itself as a fast growing research area. Obviously not all questions have been resolved and there is still a lively debate about whether data can be explained without recourse to metacognitive explanations. However, this debate should not obscure the fact that real progress has taken place. Not only is there now a rich body of evidence available, but many of the original non-metacognitive explanations once proposed are not tenable anymore in light Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web of newer data. Rather than weakening the field, this back-andforth debate between new data and new alternative explanations has created an invigorating effect, a likely indicator of continued growth in the next few years. I envisage two main research lines where this growth will take place.
The first research line is centred within each paradigm devoted to investigating metacognition. For instance, using the information-seeking paradigm will allow researchers to explore additional questions such as whether individuals can anticipate that they will forget some piece of information. Currently, all the work done to date has tested whether individuals can judge whether their information is still adequate to locate the reward. Will subjects that still have current access to this information be able to anticipate that it may degrade over time? One way to test this would be to show that subjects 'study' longer or leave special marks when they know that the retrieval event will take longer (see Schneider and Sodian (1988) and Sodian and Schneider (1990) for related paradigms).
Still within the information-seeking paradigm, another direction in which the field can progress is by testing the predictions made by the anxiety-mediated theory. One first step in this endeavour will require a precise measurement of the levels of anxiety that individuals experience when they opt for seeking or not seeking information. A second step will consist of manipulating an individual's levels of anxiety either by behavioural or pharmacological means and observing the effects on information seeking. However, the application of certain manipulations (e.g. pharmacological) will have to be restricted to certain groups of individuals or species. Finally, one important question that deserves research attention is whether individuals who cannot currently recall a piece of information are nonetheless able to reliably predict that they will be able to recall that information in the future, the socalled tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon in humans. Such data would allow comparative researchers to strengthen the links with researchers focusing on human metacognition.
The second research line that should be developed further, especially if we are to trace the evolution of metacognition, Seeking information in non-human animals: weaving a metacognitive web consists of establishing stronger connections between paradigms within the comparative literature. One of the most encouraging signs that this may be a viable alternative is the convergence of findings from different paradigms and species that this chapter and others (e.g. Smith 2009 ) have highlighted. However, this tentative connection needs to be tested more systematically and rigorously. The next step would require using batteries of metacognitive tasks administered to the same individuals to see how they relate to each other. Crucially, each of the tasks forming the battery should include not only the basic task but also several of its variations that would allow researchers a more fine-grained assessment of an individual's metacognitive capabilities.
Furthermore, this method needs to be applied to multiple species so that one can begin to trace the evolution of metacognitive abilities. An added benefit of this increased connectivity between paradigms is that the two traditions in psychology that have guided metacognitive research in nonhuman animals, cognitive and developmental, may forge closer links with each other.
